.
Before the Missouri Court of Appeals
in Springfield, Missouri
MARTIN F. LINDSTEDT, )
Relator, )
)
)
vs. ) Case No. _________________
)
Newton County Clerk KAY BAUM, )
Chief Election Official of Newton County, )
and Missouri Secretary of State, )
Chief Election Official of Missouri )
REBECCA COOK )
Respondents )
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
and
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ELECTION LAWS
Comes now the Relator, Martin Lindstedt, before this court
of jurisdiction granted by the Missouri Supreme Court, RSMo 115.333,
Section 2, and Art. 5 Section 4(1), Constitution of Missouri, to
petition for a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents Kay
Baum and Rebecca M. Cook, to place Relator's name on the
general election ballot of November 5, 1996 as the
Libertarian Party candidate for the office of Newton County
Sheriff.
Relator also petitions this appellate Court to ban
unconstitutional provisions of Missouri election law which
handicap third political parties and their candidates from
being able to participate in state and local elections.
Statement of Facts.
1. The Newton County Libertarian Party, upon post-primary
reorganization (RSMo 115.615) on August 20, 1996, decided to
run candidates in the general election to fill positions
otherwise uncontested. Relator was re-elected Chairman of
the Newton County Libertarian Party. Relator had lost the
statewide Libertarian Party primary for the office of
governor, and was now free to run as an unopposed
Libertarian candidate in any office which lacked a
Libertarian Party candidate. All of the elected and
appointed members of the Newton County Libertarian Party
Central Committee formed a nominating committee and
unanimously granted Relator the nomination to run for the
office of Sheriff court action permitting.
2. On August 27, 1996, Relator dropped by the County
Clerk's office and orally informed the county clerk's office
that Relator wanted to run for sheriff. Would there be a
problem with this? Since the Respondent was out of the
office, the other county workers did not know and could not
give Relator an answer.
3. On August 30, 1996 Relator petitioned Respondent Baum
via a letter (enclosed) explaining the legal and political
reasons why Relator has the right to be printed on the
general election ballot as a Libertarian Party candidate for
sheriff. Also presented were the relevant forms filled out
pursuant to RSMo 115.377 Section 1 Certificate of
nomination and RSMo 115.377 Section 3 Declaration of
Candidacy.
Respondent Baum refused to place Relator's name on the
ballot. Relator informed Respondent of the provisions of
RSMo 115.333 Section 1's requirement of a statement
outlining the refusal backed by a finding of fact and
conclusion of law, to be given by September 10, 1996.
Although the actual provisions of RSMo 115.333 Section 1 say
"seventh Tuesday prior to general election", which would be
Sept. 17, 1996, both Relator and Respondent Baum agreed that
Sept. 10, 1996 was the actual deadline.
4.A. On September 12, 1996, after waiting two days after
the deadline for Respondent's statement or permission to
file, Relator presented Respondent Baum with another letter
asking for her determination or permission and if Relator
did not get it, Relator's intention to pursue court action.
Respondent Baum said she did not have a RSMo 115.333 Section
1 written refusal, although she did ask the Respondent
Secretary of State's office counsel and the Newton County
Prosecuting Attorney, Greg Bridges, to provide such mandated
written determination but they refused to provide her with
such.
4.B. It was understood by Relator that Respondent Baum
made a good faith effort to secure this RSMo 115.333 Section
1 mandated determination, but that Respondent Cook's office
and the County Attorney Bridges had refused to provide
Respondent Baum with a legal determination for the refusal,
although both Respondent Cook's office and Lawyer Bridges
told Respondent Baum to not place Relator's name on the
Libertarian ballot for the general election. Respondent Baum
was left on her own to explain why election law 115.333
Section 1's demand for a issuance of statement was not
obeyed to Relator.
4.C. Relator informed Respondent Baum that while he bore
no ill-will toward Respondent Baum while despising the
cowardly and corrupt manner in which Respondent Cook's legal
staff and Lawyer Bridges left her in the lurch while urging
her to disobey the law, Relator was determined to do
everything necessary to pursue his and his political party's
right to run for public office and the voters of Newton
County to have a free and substantial right to electoral
choice.
Since Respondent Baum refused to place Relator's name on
the general election ballot and could not give any valid
legal reasons behind the refusal, Relator informed
Respondent Baum of his intentions to file a petition for
writ of mandamus in the Newton County circuit court to force
Respondent Baum to place Relator's name on the general
election ballot as the Libertarian Party candidate for the
office of Newton County Sheriff.
5. On Sept. 17, 1996, Relator hand-delivered a copy of
the enclosed petition for writ of mandamus to Respondent
Baum's office (She was out.) and then filed that petition
before the Newton County Circuit Court where it was given
the Case No. CV396-771CC.
6. As enclosed docket sheet shows, on Sept. 23, 1996
Lawyer Bridges finally gave a response to Relator's petition
for mandamus, having refused to give any legal reason before
Sept. 23 as to why Relator should be denied ballot status.
Relator is convinced that Lawyer Bridges' response to
petition writ by means of misquoting election law is a
deliberate fraud upon the Newton County court, an example of
election offenses as named in RSMo 115.631 Section 1, and
RSMo115.635 Section 12, and an willful and deliberate
violation of Rule 4 Section 3.3 (a) and Rule 4.1 (a),
Professional Conduct, Missouri Rules of Court.
7. On Sept. 24, 1996, without Relator being advised of
the hearing, Circuit Judge Timothy Perigo substantially
followed Lawyer Bridges' response and denied Relator's
petition for writ of mandamus contrary to statutory, case,
and Constitutional law.
Much like Lawyer Bridges, Judge Perigo seems to have
committed election offenses as named in RSMo 115.631 Section
1, and RSMo115.635 Section 12, however Judge Perigo will
likely avail himself of the concept of `judicial immunity'
to protect himself from prosecution for these election
felonies.
8. Relator, mitigated damages caused by Respondent
election officials', Lawyer Bridges' and Judge Perigo's
violations of Relator's, the Newton County Libertarian
Party's, and voters' civil, human, and political rights
under color of election law, by filing as an independent
write-in candidate on October 1, 1996.
9. Relator is petitioning this Court for relief of a
free, open, fair election for the office of Sheriff of
Newton County. If this matter can be resolved quickly by
rule of law before the Nov. 5 election, it will not be
necessary to hold a new election to account for the absentee
votes unless the general election results dictate such new
election.
10.Revision. Relator filed substantially this same
petition on Friday, October 4, 1996 to the Missouri Supreme
Court, within the provisions of RSMo 115.333 Section 2. On
Monday, October 7, 1996, Relator received a call from the
Clerk's office of the Missouri Supreme Court informing
Relator that this petition would not be filed or heard until
the Missouri Court of Appeals had decided on it first. A
copy of Relator's Petition of Grievance protesting such
conduct is enclosed. However Relator is proceeding to
hereby jump through this additional procedural hoop imposed
by the Missouri Supreme Court under color of law by filing
this revised (Pages 1, 4, and 19) writ petition before this
appellate court.
Arguments Supporting Mandamus.
1. Relator's first order of business is to attack the
willful perjuries committed by Lawyer Bridge's misquoting of
law in his Sept. 23, 1996 Response.
1.1.A. In paragraph 1 of Lawyer Bridges' response, Lawyer
Bridges admits Relator filed necessary forms " . . .
pursuant to 115.357 RSMo." Then Lawyer Bridges goes on to
misquote RSMo 115.377, and quotes sections of the law which
do not apply such as Section 115.373 and Section 115.375,
saying "Relator did not meet deadlines for filing outlined .
. .Relator did not timely file for the office he seeks and
his name cannot be placed on the ballot." Lawyer Bridges
pretends it is a matter of "filing deadlines," not
mentioning the fact that the ostensible reason for filing
deadlines is for the purposes of properly printing the
ballot -- not to keep candidates off the ballot under color
of election "deadlines."
Digging further into Lawyer Bridges' layer of deceit,
RSMo 115.373 has to do with selecting new candidates via
Party nominating committee to replace dead, disqualified, or
withdrew candidates. As Party Chairman and Candidate,
Relator has never pretended that another Libertarian
candidate was running for Sheriff, and that he or she run
off, croaked off, or got kicked off the ballot. Relator
states the fact that Party nominating committees have a duty
to select candidates to fill vacancies, and that the purpose
of this lawsuit is to assert his political party's
unlawfully usurped rights and duties to fill candidacies for
elected positions.
Looking further into RSMo 115.373, one finds that Party
nominating Committees have until the seventh Tuesday (Sept.
17) to fill a withdrawal for the general election and no
later than 5:00 p.m. on the Friday before the general
election (Nov. 1, 1996) for candidate withdrawal or death.
Relator announced his intentions to file on August 27, 1996
and filed on August 30, 1996. In most years, August 27 or
August 30 occur before September 17 or November 1.
1.1.B. The actual statute mentioned in RSMo 115.377 is
RSMo 115.363, not 115.373 as Lawyer Bridges said. Lawyer
Bridges mentioned the wrong statute (115.373) in his
Response, either by design or by incompetence.
RSMo 115.363 was specifically mentioned by Relator in his
August 30, 1996 petitioning letter as forming a legal basis
for his valid candidacy, in that it specifically allows
Party nominating committees to nominate candidates for the
general election in certain circumstances, such as the
death, disqualification, or withdrawal of the present
candidate. While Relator admitted that none of the
enumerated circumstances fit his case, this actual statute
did indicate the functions of a Party nominating committee:
to nominate a new candidate to fill a vacancy.
Which brings us to the usurpations into candidate
selection committed under color of election law in violation
of conflicts of interest by incumbent politicians alluded to
in Judge Clarence Thomas in his dissent in U.S. Term Limits
v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct 1842, p.1890. Any rights not
specifically granted to the government via constitution
remain with the people, and even if granted to the
government, still remain with the people if they are
inherent rights which predate the Constitution, hence
inalienable rights. See U.S. Constitution, Amendments 9 &
10. RSMo 115.363, by specifically naming which rights a
Party nominating committee retains, improperly and
fraudulently takes away inherent inalienable rights (implied
in U.S. Constitution Art. 1) to fill any vacancy which
occurs and which a political party is then able to fill.
RSMo 115.363 violates Relator's and the NCLP's rights by
impermissably stating what we can do -- as if that's it --
as opposed to a having a lawful reason for stating that
which we cannot do because it infringes on the rights of
others or specifically interferes with the duty of the
election officials to hold open, fair, and honest elections.
Never mentioned are compelling reasons by which election
officials impermissably burden inherent political rights.
These laws and provisions, by granting major political
parties a chance to fill vacancies from their ample store of
political hacks, works as the political equivalent of a bill
of attainder (forbidden by U.S. Constitution Art. 1 Sec. 9)
against struggling third-parties who do not have as large
selection of candidates or party organization. These
statutes would be far more legitimate if they forbade
nominating committees altogether, thus disallowing special
provisioning for the vagaries of demographics working
against the older, senile, and corrupt candidates of the
self-entrenched Democrat and Republican political parties.
While a vacancy filled at the very last minute can upset
ballot printing duties by election officials, in this
particular case no such thing occurred as Relator and
Relator's political party announced their intent to run
Relator for the office of sheriff long before the ballot was
printed for the general election. (See RSMo 115.391 and
115.383.) Any expenses involved in printing new general
election ballots is entirely due to Respondents' and their
lawyers' and their judges' intransigence in not allowing
Relator on the ballot (under color of election law) in a
timely fashion.
Relator submits that election statute RSMo 115.363, due
to what it does say and what it doesn't admit, helps
Realtor's cause. Relator views with extreme suspicion Lawyer
Bridges' misquotation of RSMo 115.373 as being relevant to
RSMo 115.377 when 115.373 is not mentioned at all in
115.377. If lawyers are allowed to misquote the law
whenever it suits their purposes, then courtrooms will be
filled with a whole swarm of these licensed human vultures
babbling deceit under color of professed ignorance stealing
everything not red-hot or nailed down from private citizens
who don't or can't bother to crack open a single lawbook and
catch them at it.
1.1.C. Lawyer Bridges further misquotes another statute,
RSMo 115.375 as having relevance due to "filing deadlines"
to RSMo 115.377. This is even more dishonest than the
115.373 quote because RSMo 115.357 allows chairmen of
nominating committees, (Relator is chairman of the NCLP
nominating committee. See Relator's RSMo 115.377 Section 1
certification of nomination by committee chairman of Aug.
30.) greater latitude to fill vacancies by extending the
deadlines for filing to 9:00 a.m. October 28 or 9:00 a.m.
Nov. 1 or 5:00 p.m. Nov. 1, 1996.
Relator would like to remind Lawyer Bridges and Judge
Perigo (who in his decision of Sept. 24 claims to have
reviewed this election law stated by Lawyer Bridges) that
August 30, 1996 occurs this year before Oct. 28 or Nov. 1,
1996.
1.2. In paragraph 2 of Lawyer Bridges' mendacityrpiece of
Sept. 23, he immediately tries to obfuscate jurisdiction by
misquoting RSMo 115.333, and tying it to loose ends of RSMo
115.325 and 115.327, which are not specifically mentioned,
but merely alluded to. This fraudulent mixing of
irrelevancies and ignoring that which is relevant jumbles
and deliberately confuses the matter. Relator will
straighten it out.
1.2.A. "Relator demands relief pursuant to Section
115.333 (1) RSMO," intones Lawyer Bridges. This is a quarter-
truth, if that. Relator specifically mentioned RSMo 115.333
Section (2) and the Article 5, Section 14, Constitution of
Missouri as giving jurisdiction to pursue a petition for
writ of mandamus. Since the 40th Judicial Circuit took upon
itself to deny writ petition, by this very action it admits
that Relator had the right to petition for writ and that
that court had jurisdiction. Every court case has to start
somewhere, and in the case of a person demanding to run for
the office of county sheriff, the proper place to start is
the county circuit court, not the Missouri Supreme Court or
a Federal court. If the Newton County circuit court had
failed to acknowledge jurisdiction, then it would have had
to transfer it to a court which did have jurisdiction in
accordance with Constitution of Missouri Art. 5, Section 11.
Does this Court wish to have to hear county matters as the
court of original jurisdiction because some County lawyer
hopes to pull a jurisdictional dodge on the credulous?
1.2.B. Lawyer Bridges dishonestly implied that Relator
placed sole reliance on RSMo 115.333 Section 1. Relator
mentioned RSMo 115.333 Section 1 to show the 'bad faith'
inherent of Election Official Respondents Baum and Cook in
not obeying the law of that section's requirement for a
determination and to taunt the deliberate cowardice of both
Respondents' lawyer corps in refusing to give a legal
reasoning behind the refusal of Respondents to place Relator
on the ballot. (See Page 4, Paragraph 6a and 6b, Petition
for Mandamus, filed Sept. 17, 1996.) These election
officials are supposed to obey election law and their paid
lawyers are supposed to help them obey the law. Neither
Respondents nor lawyers saw fit to do so. While Relator did
amuse himself chronicling this lawlessness and cowardice,
there are sufficient amounts of law outside RSMo 115.333 to
enable filing suit.
1.2.C. Lawyer Bridges says Relator did not file petitions
or declarations pursuant to RSMo 115.325 and 115.327. So
what? There are other irrelevancies which Relator does not
file lawsuits upon.
Relator is not seeking to form a new political party run
or run as an independent candidate. Relator is seeking to be
placed on the ballot as a Libertarian Party candidate for
the office of County Sheriff. The Libertarian Party already
has ballot access in Missouri. See State ex. rel Coker-
Garcia v. Blunt, 849 S.W. 2d 81. Relator got over four
percent of the vote running as a state representative in
Newton County in 1994 and other Libertarian candidates
running in Newton County have garnered over seven percent of
the general election vote. So RSMo 115.325 and 115.327 are
absolutely irrelevant to this case, deceit of Lawyer Bridges
notwithstanding.
While portions of RSMo 115.333 allude to RSMo 115.325 and
115.327, most of RSMo 115.333 Sections 1 and 2 do not. Most
of Section 1 deals with the duty of election officials to
provide a determination upon conflicts with the election
subchapter and most of Section 2 deals with the court
procedure and standing.
RSMo 115.333 says (first sentences):
115.333. Determination of validity or invalidity; when
made -- refusal to file, procedure to have court determine
validity -- 1. When any petition is filed with the
secretary of state or an election authority under the
provisions of this subchapter, the secretary of state or the
election authority shall determine whether of not it
complies with the provisions of this subchapter. . . .
Don't Lawyer Bridges have enough sense to figure out what
"any petition" means or have the honesty to admit that "this
subchapter" must refer to election laws outside 115.333, not
just 115.325 to 115.327? Lawyer Bridges wants to
dishonestly imply that 115.333 is a mere legislative
"suburb" of "Greater 115.325."
Then, having gained full foolish fearless forked-tongue-
fashion force, Lawyer Bridges finishes paragraph 2 of page
one with a leap and a pounce and finds himself motioning for
a dismissal by page 2 under color of "standing."
What dishonest nonsense.
Relator is a registered voter. Relator is chairman of the
Newton County Libertarian Party (NCLP). Relator is chairman
of the NCLP nominating committee. Relator was nominated to
run for sheriff by the NCLP nominating committee. Relator
petitioned the election officials to put his name on the
ballot. Relator is filing the suits and acting as counsel
for Relator. If Relator does not have "standing" to sue,
then nobody, no-how, nowhere has standing to sue, and we can
all dismiss the courts and go home and make all them lawyers
like and unlike Lawyer Bridges have to do honest work for a
change.
1.2.D. All these perjuries in quoting the law makes
Lawyer Bridges liable for committing an election offense
under provisions of RSMo 115.631, Section 1 -- Class One
Election offenses, a felony connected with the right of
suffrage. Section 1 says Lawyer Bridges shouldn't "Willfully
and falsely" make any certificate, affidavit or statement
required to be made under "any provision of sections 115.001
to 115.641." All this misquoting the law in his Response to
deny Relator his rightful place on the ballot qualifies as a
willful and false statement. RSMo 115.635 Section 12 applies
as well against Lawyer Bridges.
1.2.E. Lawyer Bridges is touchy (see Respondent's `Comes
now' section of Sept. 23, 1996 about him getting elected)
about his "election" to the office of Newton County
Prosecuting Attorney because of a number of conflicts of
interest.
Lawyer Bridges ran as a "Republican" write-in candidate
against a "Democrat" write-in candidate in 1994 for the
office of prosecuting attorney and won. Lawyer Greg Bridge's
brother, Mark Bridges, is always running as a Republican
something or other and getting elected. His father, Robert
Bridges was the County Clerk, hence the chief election
official of Newton County before his retirement in 1994.
This creates a conflict of interest, which has never been
properly addressed.
RSMo 115.085 says election judges cannot serve in an
electoral jurisdiction wherein a relative facing opposition
is running for public office. Election challengers and
watchers must have the same qualifications as election
judges. See RSMo 115.105 and 115.107. So which regulation
makes the supreme election official in a jurisdiction immune
to following the same qualifications as proscribed for
lesser election posts?
Lawyer Bridges 'won' his write-in campaign. However,
since Relator does not have a daddy counting the write-in
votes for him, Relator is a tad miffed at the suggestion
that Relator has the same electoral `opportunities for
success' as a write-in `Independent' candidate while lacking
the same preponderance of advantages.
In addition, as a Republican Prosecuting Attorney for the
County, Lawyer Bridges has publicized his strong ties to the
incumbent Republican Sheriff. The Sheriff and Prosecutor and
judges run quite the efficient justice mill around here.
When one of the sheriff's deputies was caught destroying
campaign material of a Republican primary challenger, Lawyer
Bridges pushed off the investigation to the Missouri Highway
Patrol which came up with a whitewash.
Looking at the November general election ballot, with the
exception of county commissioner wherein Relator was able to
get his brother to run as a Libertarian candidate and one
Democrat decided to run, for five out of six county offices
the Republican candidate is unopposed. Lawyer Bridges got
his brother running unopposed for something as a Republican
again. The present county incumbents and judges are all
Republicans! Newton County looks and acts like it is a one-
party-rule state like Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. It
could make better pretentious towards holding free, open and
fair elections if it would allow two Libertarian candidates
from a young, new party to run for county office in addition
to the one Democrat from a dying political party who decided
to bother. What are the Republicans scared of? Election
competition? Relator doubts that the founding fathers had
the present situation in Newton County in mind when they
wrote U.S. Constitution, Article 4, Section 4. "Republican
form of government guaranteed."
2.0 Relator has accused Lawyer Bridges of deliberately
misquoting the law and committing acts of fraud upon the
40th Judicial Circuit in Newton County. Relator notes that
Judge Timothy Perigo seemed rather eager to let himself be
"fooled," asservations to the contrary made by Judge Perigo
as to how he "specifically reviews each statute cited by
each respective party" in his decision of Sept. 24, 1996.
Judge Perigo seems to know about as much law as Lawyer
Bridges, having himself been Prosecuting and Newton County
Attorney before it was Lawyer Bridges' turn.
2.1.A "Perigo's ruling echoed a response to Lindstedt's
petition filed by Greg Bridges, prosecuting attorney." said
the September 25, 1996, Page 1C newspaper story by The
Joplin Globe. While newspapers usually get legal matters
wrong, this line precisely illustrated Judge Perigo's
slavish agreement with Lawyer Bridges' misstatement of
election law. (See point 1.2.C., this document)
"Relator is requesting relief pursuant to Section 115.333
R.S.Mo. Said section applies to two types of petitions . . .
" No, relator was not seeking sole remedy under
jurisdiction of 115.333. Also, RSMo 115.333 applies to the
whole part of the election subsection, not just to sections
115.325 and 115.327.
". . .Since Relator did not petition the County Clerk for
nomination as an independent candidate nor did Relator
petition the County Clerk for nomination [{as an} deleted]
for the formation of a new political party, Section 115.333
simply does not apply. Accordingly, this Court has no
authority to proceed under 115.333. . ." Relator is not
seeking nomination as an independent candidate nor trying to
form a new political party. Relator does not petition courts
for stuff he doesn't want or need. However, RSMo 115.333
must apply to all of the election subsection, else it would
be numbered 115.325 and/or 115.327. Therefore, Judge Perigo
or another judge in the Newton County circuit not only had
the authority, but the duty to proceed under 115.333.
2.1.B. Even if "Court had no authority to proceed under
115.333. . .", then by what authority would Respondent Baum
have for not allowing Relator on the ballot as a Libertarian
Candidate for Newton County Sheriff and thus violating the
First Amendment rights of Relator, Relator's political party
and unknown voters? Respondent Baum's caution? Respondent
Cook's orders? Judge Perigo's whims? Lawyer Bridges'
irritation against Relator? The political advantage of
Republican politicians in Newton County? What? This is
supposed to be a country under rule of law -- not of men.
2.1.C. Relator notes that Judge Perigo implies Relator
did "petition" in the RSMo 115.333 sense the County Clerk
for something, even if judge alleges that it was improper
petitioning.
2.2 In his quest for additional reasons to deny Relator
his petition writ, Judge Perigo seized upon RSMo 115.343.
"Court notes that Section 115.343 RSMo provides in part "The
person receiving the greatest number of votes at a primary
election as a party candidate for an office shall be the
only (emphasis added) candidate of that party for the office
at the general election."
Sort of puts the lie to the "Court specifically reviews
each statute cited by each respective party." crap written
earlier by Judge Perigo, doesn't it? Unless Judge Perigo
means that he will look at the statutes like Lawyer Bridges
does -- misquote where necessary, ignore when possible. What
happened to all the statutory provisions for nominating
committees? Sort of makes them either irrelevant or
prejudiced to favor entrenched political parties, doesn't
it? Whatever happened to RSMo 115.363, 115.377, RSMo 115.333
and all the Constitutional stuff -- U.S. and Missouri --
quoted by Relator and RSMo 115.377, 115.373, 115.375,
115.333, 115.325, and 115.327 "quoted" by Lawyer Bridges?
Relator and the NCLP has no need to run a primary to fill
a vacancy. RSMo 115.343 is a constitutionally impermissible
intrusion on political rights of a party to choose its
candidates for the general election. As has been mentioned
before in Relator's petitions to County Clerk and writ
petition, no principal(s) except the NCLP has "standing" to
interfere in this political matter.
2.3 About to run out of space on the docket sheet, Judge
Perigo comes to a close. "Accordingly, this Court is
prohibited by State law from granting Relator's requested
relief. The law does provide for write in candidates.
Petition for writ of mandamus is denied. TWP."
Thanks a lot, Judge Perigo. Relator has been handed a sop
to "open elections," with all the possibilities of getting
to run as an `Independent,' write-in candidate depending
upon the memory and ability of voters to write Relator's
last name which that implies. (Almost certain loss to
incumbent with advantage of ballot access. See 115 S.Ct
1842, p.1868, notes 43 & 45. ) Relator has less than a
splendid chance to win the election as a write-in candidate
since he doesn't have a single relative counting the votes
for him, or even a friendly political hack working in the
election commission of Newton County. Certainly not, now
that Relator has taken up suing Newton County election
officials.
2.4 Judge Perigo ignored every single case cite, statute,
and Constitutional provision enumerated in Relator's writ
petition. No where is it ever mentioned as to the inherent
validity of the (misquoted) election laws nor how they apply
against Relator trying something not specifically forbidden.
The sense of these election laws is one of "You can't do
that!" without giving a sense of exactly what is forbidden,
the rational behind these laws, and where the underlying
authority to make these laws is derived.
As far as legislative intent behind the making of these
laws, it is an evasive one consisting of wishing to
influence the selection of candidates under color of
election law to further the political interests of the rule-
makers while pretending elections are on the up and up.
Since these matters impacting legitimacy are of
Constitutional importance, judicial silence is an admission
of guilt on Judge Perigo's part, because judicial notice
would cause Respondents' cause to unravel. Judge Perigo had
the authority to rule the election laws as applied are
unconstitutional. Judge Perigo refused to use this power
long asserted by the courts to work against the Newton
County political status quo.
3.1. This Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
mandamus in this matter. RSMo 115.333 Section 2. Article 5,
Sections 2, 3, and 4, Constitution of Missouri. Procedure
for obtaining said writs is governed by Missouri Rules of
Court, Rules 84.22-84.26 and 94.
3.2.A. This Court also has appellate power and power of
judicial review over the inferior state courts. Article 5,
Sections 2, 3, and 4, Constitution of Missouri.
3.2.B. This Court has several times dodged and evaded its
obligations by ignoring its Constitution of Missouri Article
5 Section 11 duties by protesting its lack of jurisdiction
and then refusing to transfer the matter to the appropriate
court.
In fact, at times this Court has sent its legal counsel,
Bill L. Thompson, to stall and provide cover for refusing to
hear cases. Relator has searched and searched the
Constitution of Missouri without finding any justification
of this conduct contrary to Art. 5, Section 11. Enclosed is
a copy of a letter of March 21, 1996 from Lawyer Thompson
regarding the election case Lindstedt v. The Missouri
Libertarian Party, et.al. which had to be re-filed in
Federal District Court on July 22,1996, this Court having
refused to do its duty to hear the case.
Relator sincerely hopes for improved conduct from this
Court.
4. While Relator admits State election authorities have
the power to regulate the time, place, and manner of
elections, these "election authorities" DO NOT have any
legitimate authority to usurp the role of the electors by
disqualifying constitutionally qualified candidates under
color of election statute. See U.S. Term Limits vs. Thornton
115 S.Ct. 1842 1842, p.1844 (c). States only have authority
to protect the integrity and regularity of election
procedures, see Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,730, 733., not
provide them with license to impose substantive
qualifications that would exclude classes of candidates from
federal office. See U.S. 14th Amendment to see application
of this precept to States' lack of license to exclude
classes of candidates from State office.
5. The only principal who has standing to determine any
extra-constitutional qualifications to run for office under
their Party ticket is the Newton County Libertarian Party.
The State and County election authorities lack standing to
complain about this matter, as does the Republican incumbent
Sheriff. The County Prosecutor lacks standing to make a
complaint. Since no person, government organization,
election official or anyone else lacks standing to complain
about this matter, Relator should be allowed to run as a
candidate forthwith.
Lawyer Bridges' and Judge Perigo's disingenuous
suggestions that Relator has no standing to be placed on the
ballot because of election law, are an attempt to give
standing to those people who do not and should not have
standing. Election law should not be used in a manner to
establish political oligarchies. U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton, 115 S.Ct. 1842, p1849.
The concept of standing is such an elemental precept of
law, that Relator should have no need to quote cites to this
court.
6. The Newton County Libertarian Party has an
affirmative right to nominate candidates to the general
election. See ". . . a political party has a right . . . to
select a `standard bearer who best represents the party's
ideologies and preferences.'" Eu v. San Francisco Democratic
Committee, 489 U.S. 214, at 224. Also see "Parties have an
associational right to `broaden the base of public
participation and support of [their] activities." Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 at 214, and
"Parties have the right `to select their own candidate.'"
Tashjian, Id. at 230.
7. The Newton County Libertarian Party's nominating
committee and candidate have otherwise obeyed all but the
egregiously unconstitutional provisions usurping the rights
of this political party and candidates imposed by RSMo
Chapter 115.305 to 115.405. Those statutory provisions which
do not violate their constitutional rights have been obeyed
by both Party and Relator candidate. See letters of August
30, and September 12, 1996 and relevant portions of RSMo
Chapter 115.
8. There is a lot of whining about voter apathy. If the
purpose of elections is for voters to merely to rubber-stamp
third- and fourth-rate candidates propped up by the major
political parties, then voter cynicism and the loss of
governmental legitimacy will be ensured. If election
officials are allowed to enforce unconstitutional laws made
by politicians who wish to make extra-constitutional
qualifications on competing candidates, then Newton County,
the State of Missouri, and the entire country can be held to
be politically equivalent to Nazi Germany and Communist
Russia in that only one-party candidates are allowed to run
for general election and the rest of the electorate is
allowed only the faint sop of write-in candidates or leaving
blank the slate as political protest. Turning the ballot
into a mere rubber-stamping by voters of the current status
quo undermines the alleged democratic foundations of this
regime and makes its claim of `consent of the governed'
spurious. The voters are not fooled and will increasingly
either boycott elections or refuse to vote, spurning the
false illusion of `government by consent of the governed.'
Allowing Relator to be on the general election ballot
gives the voters a clear choice between law-enforcement
alternatives not found in the Republican primary; a mere
bragging contest as to which Republican could establish a
police state in Newton County the fastest. Since the
Democrats in Newton County couldn't be bothered running a
candidate for Sheriff, the Newton County Libertarian Party
should be allowed to do so now that a constitutionally
qualified candidate like Relator has stepped forward.
Free, open, honest, elections by the voters are supposed
to be the basis for legitimate government power, as opposed
to laws made up by politicians to further consolidate their
rule and eliminate competition by fiat. What good does it do
to increase the number of voters, ala "Motor Voter' election
laws, without increasing the political choices with which to
use those votes? Looking at the Newton County slate, the
ruling party consensus seems to be that all those new voters
can vote for whomever they want -- as long as they vote
Republican.
The gist of this argument is paralleled in `Powell's
Reliance on History and Democratic Principles,' pages 1848-
1851 of U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct 1842.
9. Looking at the Newton County ballot, Relator is struck
by the wide choice of political candidates and political
parties at the national and statewide levels and the paucity
of parties and candidates at the local level. The people and
the courts, under pressure, have been forced to give way to
the desires of enough people to select candidates at those
levels.
However, it is at the local level wherein people select
the government which impacts upon themselves the most. The
mandate of allowing political choice must eventually trickle
down to those levels, as local government needs political
competition and legitimacy as well. While the `vanity
parties' of Ross Perot will only show up once every four
years, some of these third parties are here to stay at the
local level, building coalitions, and sharing party
organizational talent and candidates -- now having inherent
and soon growing statutory and constitutionally interpreted
rights to do so. The election law mandated dikes erected to
prevent the need for political will eventually collapse.
Whether it is by flood destroying the dike or by water
seeping through and seeking new channels is the question
before this Court.
Relator presciently brings this action forth to
peacefully infiltrate around the political blockage erected
by political special interests.
10. On the evening of October 3, after a political forum
sponsored by Crowder College, Republican incumbent Sheriff
Ron Doerge informed Relator that he told Respondent Baum
that he has no objections to Relator's being on the ballot
as a Libertarian candidate, but that he was informed that
Respondent Baum said that this couldn't be done according to
election law.
Since the opposing candidate has professed his
willingness to compete politically face-to-face with Relator
for elective office, why are the Respondents willing to
continue hiding themselves behind their legislative walls of
'election laws' erected for political safety from
competition?
11. In the interests of saving taxpayer time and money,
it would be best to simply grant Relator's petition for
mandamus and review as to constitutionality of election law
right now, before the election of November 5, 1996. Only if
the election results of November 5 show the election close
enough for the absentee ballots cast before granting
Relator's writ petition to matter would a special election
be necessary. Also, RSMo 115.383 provides for pasters to be
printed at little expense, thus not necessitating higher
reprinting costs.
If this Court decides to rule against Relator, Relator
makes no secret of his intention to file in federal courts
to validate his political rights. If the federal courts want
to baldly tell the electorate that they can only vote for
that which the major political parties offer them, then so
be it.
Summary:
There is no specific election law prohibiting Relator
from getting and using the NCLP nominating committee's
nomination to run for public office. The assumption used so
far by Respondent's is a mere wailing of "He can't do that.
He's not supposed to do that." Relator is not trying to form
a new political party, or run as an independent or trying to
win a contested primary race. There is only implied
`election law' which by court and lawyer `interpretation'
enforces the demands of the current political status quo.
Even if there was a specific election law forbidding
Relator from running as a candidate for an open vacancy, the
election law would be unconstitutional.
There can not be free and open elections without allowing
candidates who meet minimum constitutional requirements to
run for elective office. Any added qualifications imposed by
any group or government is a violation of the principles
behind self-rule by the consent of the electors, supposedly
governed by the persons they freely choose to fill elective
positions. When additional qualifications are imposed, it is
not the electors who rule, but the usurping qualification
imposers.
Does this Court choose to rule over the people through
the groups it allows to determine election qualifications:
Yes or No?
Suggestions Supporting Mandamus and Judicial Review
Relator has placed the case, statutory and Constitutional
cites in his Arguments. There is no need to create
additional paperwork restating the obvious.
Request for Relief
Wherefore, the Relator asks that this court: (1) grant
mandamus and direct Respondent Baum to place Relator's name
on the general election ballot of November 5, 1996 as the
Libertarian Party candidate for Sheriff of Newton County,
(2) declare as unconstitutional any election laws which
impose extra-conditional qualifications upon political
candidates, (3) plus whatever other relief this Court finds
just and proper.
_______________________________ ___________________
Relator Date
Exhibits: Filed copy election law indicating intent to file
for sheriff on Aug. 27, 1996; Letter petitioning to file for
Sheriff, August 30, 1996; Letter asking for determination as
to status of Sptember 12, 1996; Petition for Writ of
Mandamus of Sept. 17, 1996; Respondent and Lawyer Bridges'
Response of Sept. 23, 1996; Docket Sheet, Newton County
Circuit Court of Sept. 24, 1996; Letter from Lawyer Bill
Thompson of March 21, 1996; Copy of Joplin Globe of Sept.
25, 1996; Copy of Newton County Ballot; Petition for writ of
mandamus of October 4, 1996 to the Missouri Supreme Court;
Petition of Grievance to Missouri Supreme Court; Petition in
Forma Pauperis to the Missouri Supreme Court for leave to
proceed as a poor person.
Amended Motion to Proceed as a Poor Person to the Missouri
Appellate Court.
Certificate of Service
A copy of this petition was hand delivered to the office
of Respondent Kay Baum, Newton County Clerk, at the Newton
County Courthouse on Tuesday, October 8, 1996.
A copy of this petition was mailed to the office of
Secretary of State Rebecca Cook, 208 State Capitol, P.O. Box
778, Jefferson City, Missouri 65101 on October 8, 1996.
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Comments: This petition was sent to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern district after the Missouri Dupreme Court refused to hear it. It had a few more things on the facts and last page, but otherwise was much the same as the copies sent to the Missouri Supreme Court.
The Missouri Court of Appeals denied this petition by calling it altogether a petition for writ of mandamus and ignoring the petition for judicial review of the constitutionality of the 'election' laws. This enabled them to get around giving their findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Missouri Supreme Court did exactly the very same thing ten days later on October 18, 1996.
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